How can a non-democratic regime provide proper incentives for a state bureaucracy? The dictator should gather information on the bureaucrats'performance. Such information can be collected either through a centralized source such as a secret service or a decentralized system such as free media. Free media aggregate information and thus constrain bureaucrats, but might also help citizens to coordinate on actions against the incumbent. Secret services do not leak information to the public but may also collude with the bureaucrats. We develop a simple dynamic model to argue that free media are less likely to emerge in resource-rich economies: the resource rents create incentives for dictators to cling to power. We then demonstrate that controlling for country …xed e¤ects, media are less free in oil-rich countries; the e¤ect is especially strong in less democratic countries. These results are robust to the choice of speci…cation and and a variety of controls including the level of economic development and democracy, literacy, Internet penetration, country and population size, size of government, and inequality.
information on the policy outcome makes collusion impossible. However, media also makes the policy outcome known to the public, which may threaten the dictator's position in power. If the media report that the policy has failed, the public infers that the dictator has low ability; therefore the citizens would be better o¤ replacing the dictator. What is more important, a negative media report makes the dictator's incompetence common knowledge, which is critical for a successful revolution. Indeed, revolutions involve a coordination problem; a citizen takes part in a revolt against the incumbent only if he knows that others will join a revolt (e.g., Tilly, 1978 , Chwe, 2003 , Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006 , Persson and Tabellini, 2006 . 3 We consider a dynamic game where citizens update their beliefs on the dictator's ability based on both private and public signals. In equilibrium, the dictator is replaced whenever there is a public report of the policy failure; citizens know that his misery is shared by others and everyone is su¢ ciently unhappy to rise against the incumbent.
Our theory implies that oil rich countries should have lower media freedom. Moreover, this relationship should be especially strong in less democratic countries, where other feedback channels do not function properly. We use both cross-country and panel data to test these predictions.
We take media freedom indices from Freedom House and Reporters Sans Frontiers, democracy index from Polity IV, and oil reserves and oil production from BP. Controlling for countries'…xed e¤ects, the level of economic development, democracy and other relevant variables, we …nd that the media are indeed less free in oil-rich countries. The e¤ect of natural resources on media freedom is especially strong in less democratic countries. In mature democracies, there is no relationship between oil reserves and media freedom.
The results are statistically signi…cant, economically important, and robust to a variety of controls including the level of development, literacy, Internet penetration, country and population size, size of government, and Gini index of inequality. Interestingly, the magnitude of the e¤ect is the same whether we run panel or cross-section regressions and whether we choose logarithm of oil reserves or logarithm of oil production as an independent variable. According to our estimates, increasing oil reserves by 10% would reduce media freedom by 0.4 points. In other words, if
Brazil's reserves were equal to the level of Venezuela's, Brazil's media freedom would have developed likewise. 3 Free media is not the only mechanism for aggregating information which is dangerous to rulers. Only a few autocrats allow free elections at the local level, decentralized NGO, or civil society. In this paper, we focus in particular on media, but the trade-o¤ we analyze extends to other institutions.
While we focus on testing the prediction that natural resource abundance undermines media freedom in non-democratic societies, we also control for alternative explanations. First, there is a positive correlation (and a two-way causality) between media freedom and the level of democracy per se. Our empirical test yields that natural resources are a signi…cant determinant of media freedom even controlling for the level of democracy, either present, or lagged. Second, media freedom may be negatively correlated with resource abundance as the latter provides dictators with means to compensate citizens for banning free media. Ross (2001) and Acemoglu, Robinson, and Verdier (2004) observe that the dictator might simply use resource rents to buy o¤ political challengers. (Ross, 2001 , demonstrates a signi…cant correlation between natural resource abundance and the probability of having a dictatorial regime, and so does Tsui, 2005) . In our framework, this argument implies that citizens value media freedom per se while dictators do not, e.g. for the standard reason that media may help in overcoming the coordination problem in revolts. Yet, dictators with no resources at hand are forced to allow free media as otherwise citizens would revolt. This "buy-o¤" argument treats resource rents as extra revenues available to the dictator.
From this point of view, natural resources are equivalent to foreign aid or any other sources of income that he can use to pay o¤ his citizens. We control for the total amount of resources that dictator can redistribute -GDP per capita, share of government in GDP, inequality -and …nd that our results are robust. Finally, we provide additional evidence that media freedom does improve the quality of bureaucracy -even controlling for country …xed e¤ects and other variables. Thus, our model demonstrates that in the presence of abundant resources, dictators are less willing to allow free media. Consistent with our theory, non-democratic countries such as Nigeria, Zambia, Sierra Leone, Angola, and Saudi Arabia have vast resources and poor growth performance, while the Asian tigers of South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore, while predominantly nondemocratic in 70s and 80s, have both high growth rates and scarce natural resources. These East Asian countries have managed to establish an e¤ective meritocratic bureaucracy Rauch, 1999, 2000 ; see also Gehlbach and Keefer, 2006 , on the role of institutionalized parties in autocracies). Again, it is perhaps not coincidental that Gorbachev chose glasnost (openness) as the Soviet Union faced a substantial decline in the price of oil, 4 its major commodity export. On the contrary, with the oil price rising, Putin's Russia has experienced a signi…cant decline in any 4 While the policy of perestroika was proclaimed in 1985, it was not until 1987 that glasnost became popularized and implemented on a large scale. In 1985-1986, the major stress was on uskorenie (modernization). The sharp oil price decline took place in 1986, which was also the year of the Chernobyl disaster. media freedom ranking.
Among those dictators that chose not to liberalize the media, there is a clear pattern. They rely on security services; some even create multiple security services, speci…cally designed to spy on each other. The multiple security services are a somewhat intermediate solution, with the costs and bene…ts of both a single security service and competitive media. Making these security services compete, a dictator reduces the danger of collusion between them and bureaucrats, but also incurs a risk of information leakage to the public, not to mention substantial costs and delays. This was especially visible in "sultanistic regimes" (Chehabi and Linz, 1998, Egorov and Sonin, 2004 and Linz (1998) shows that in these regimes, the media were tightly controlled, and bureaucratic e¢ ciency was singularly low; interestingly, such regimes were especially likely to occur in resourcerich countries.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the theoretical model; Section 3 contains the analysis. In Section 4, we present empirical support for our theory. Section 5 discusses related literature. Section 6 concludes.
Theory Setup
There is an in…nite horizon economy with a dictator D, a mass 1 of identical citizens, and also a mass of 1 of short-lived bureaucrats B. There economy includes two sectors: the resource sector and the "modern" sector. The resource sector produces a globally traded good, which yields a stream of revenues Y R t = R; the cost of production is normalized to zero. The other sector is the "modern economy"; its total output depends on the provision of a public good such as property rights and contract enforcement, infrastructure, education, etc. The amount of public good provided, A t ; depends both on the policy chosen by the dictator and the e¤orts exerted by the state bureaucracy as follows.
In period t; the dictator's policy space P t consists of right ( 2 P R t ) and wrong ( 2 P W t )
policies. His ability to chose a right policy is imperfect: the probability of picking a right policy is 2 L ; H , where v L corresponds to the dictator with the low-ability type ("inept"), and H to the high-ability type ("competent"). Hereinafter we normalize H = 1: Dictators are drawn from a distribution where of them are competent and 1 are inept.
Each bureaucrat j is responsible for a single task A j and may exert either high or low e¤ort e j 2 e H ; e L in ful…lling this task; the cost of high e¤ort is c > 0; while the low e¤ort is costless.
We assume a perfect complementarity between dictator's policy choice and bureaucrat's e¤orts.
If the bureaucrat j exerts e¤ort e H and the policy choice is right 2 P R t ; then A j t = A H ; if either e¤ort is low e j = e L or the policy is wrong 2 P W t , then A j t = A L < A H . The total amount of the public good is A t = R J A t j dj, and the output of the modern sector is normalized to Y t M = A t . Thus, the total output of the economy equals
The income of citizen i in period t is
where i t is an idiosyncratic shock, i t i.i.d. with E i t = 1 (assume that i t is an atomless distribution with full support on [0; 1), c.d.f. F and p.d.f. f ).
We assume that dictator taxes the modern sector at the rate ; each citizen's after-tax income is therefore (1 ) t 0 i A t 0 . The tax rate is exogenous; one could consider a model where the dictator sets the tax rate at the level that maximizes the tax revenue subject to the distortions of the modern sector's incentives to produce. As the resource sector produces pure rent, it is natural to assume that the dictator appropriates its revenues Y t R completely. Both citizens'and the dictator's discount rate is .
Bureaucratic Incentives
The dictator cannot provide proper incentives to bureaucrats directly as he observes only the total output but not the individual bureaucrats'e¤orts. To give the bureaucrats incentives to exert high e¤ort, he may either use a centralized source of information (a "secret service") S, or free media M . We assume that the free media is unable to cooperate in concealing true evidence, while the secret service may be bribed by bureaucrats. 5 The dictator's instantaneous utility is given by and S] where A t comes from taxes from modern sector, all revenues from the resource sector accrue to the dictator, and IfXg is the indicator function which takes the value of 1 if and only if X is true; otherwise, IfXg = 0. The dictator pays the bureaucrats and the secret service to maximize his expected life-time utility
We assume that the dictator can only condition his payments to the bureaucrat j on the report s j t 2 A L ; A H that he gets about this bureaucrat's performance. This signal s j t is produced either by free media M or secret service S, depending on the regime the dictator chose. We capture the feature that S is centralized and M is not by assuming that M necessarily reports s j t = A j t ; S does not have such restriction. The reason is that it is hard for the disorganized media outlets to coordinate on publishing or broadcasting false information.
Each bureaucrat maximizes his current period's utility. He has limited liability: the wage cannot be negative. The bureaucrat chooses the e¤ort level, taking into account the dictator's ability v d ; d = L; H. If the dictator is inept, the bureaucrat does not know whether the policy he is asked to implement is right.
Media Freedom
In each period, the dictator chooses between free media and censorship (whenever he is indi¤erent between the two options, he prefers free media, e.g. as censorship has some implementation costs).
Both free media and secret service observe the amount of public goods provided by each bureaucrat; the di¤erence is in the way they report it. Free media publish the information they get. Under censorship, media are bound to publish good news, so citizens cannot distinguish between good news dictated by censorship and good news due to successful implementation of the right policy. If media are free, they publish information that allows the dictator to punish individual bureaucrats; the same information helps citizens update their beliefs about the dictator's competence. Conditional uncovers a part of the puzzle only) but not free. Media outlets invest in information acquisition, because if they do not they will eventually be out of business, and in the presence of censorship they do not invest because they do not have any incentives to do so.
on the information, citizens may conclude that the policy failed due to the dictator's incompetence, and he thus should be replaced. We also assume that the dictator's ability to impose censorship is restricted by the other (imperfect) democratic institutions: even if media are censored, citizens are able to get a truthful public signal with some probability > 0. 6 Below it will become clear that is also a probability that a failing ruler gets replaced even if there are no negative media reports; we will therefore interpret as a proxy for democratic institutions.
In addition to the public signal delivered by media, either free or censored, individuals observe their personal welfare. While this allows each of them to update her own beliefs about the dictator's ability, she cannot be sure whether the other citizens get a similar update and do not allow them to make an unambiguous conclusion about the quality of the policy.
As an alternative to the free media, the dictator may monitor the bureaucrat with the help of a secret service. The bene…t of the secret service is that it reports to the dictator, but not to the general public; there is no competitive pressure and no free-rider problem. However, the very same bene…t creates a potential for collusion with bureaucrats. A bureaucrat may o¤er a bribe to the secret service for not reporting his personal failure. This would be impossible in the case of media where the competition and free-riding would not allow such contracting. The evidence of policy failure may be concealed by secret service but may not be forged, 7 so a bureaucrat only has incentives to bribe when he fails; the secret service can accept bribes from any number of bureaucrats.
Citizens
In period t; each individual i receives a private signal y t i about her personal income and a public signal s pub (t) published in the media, which is an average of reports (truthful or not) about each bureaucrat. In the case of free media (M ), the citizens get the same signal as the dictator: s pub (t) = 6 There is a range of levels of 'political freedom' in dictatorial regimes. E.g., in the Soviet Union of late 1980s, there was no free press, but citizens have not been prosecuted for transmitting information from person to person; in 1970s, a mere personal conversation might have resulted in a (predominantly, administrative, but sometimes criminal) prosecution. In 1930-1950s, a political opinion in a private conversation often resulted in a concentration camp term or execution.
7 If S could forge the evidence of failure, it would blackmail even the hardworking bureaucrats who exerted e = e H .
This would result in S earning rents but not producing any useful information for the dictator; hence the dictator would never hire such monitors. For our results to hold we need forging evidence of failure to be at least costlier than concealing this evidence.
, while in the case of censored media citizens get a "censored" signal s pub (t) = R j2J A H = A H . At the end of each period, every citizen decides whether to participate in a revolt against the dictator in order to replace him with a new one. A revolt succeeds if and only if the share of citizens who participate exceeds ; taking part in an unsuccessful revolt costs each participant r > 0.
Thus, citizens face both collective action and free-rider problems. While we do not develop a full-scale theory of collective action (see a discussion in Robinson, 2006, and Tabellini, 2006) , we are making a few natural assumptions on citizens'behavior (see below).
Citizen i maximizes her expected welfare
Timing
The timing of events in the stage game is as follows.
1. The dictator hires bureaucrats, picks a policy from the set P t , chooses the degree of media freedom (free or censored), and makes contracts with both the bureaucrats (payments w L and w H , depending on s j 6. Citizens decide whether or not to revolt, depending on information available. If the revolt is successful the dictator is replaced with a new one. The new dictator is competent with probability and inept with probability 1 .
Equilibrium concept and assumptions
The game is dynamic, and there are multiple individuals having private information. Since payo¤-relevant variables may include all private signals that individuals got during the reign of the current dictator, the widely-used concept of the Markov Perfect Equilibrium (e.g., Robinson, 2006, and Laguno¤, 2006) is not directly applicable. On the other hand, the set of all subgame perfect equilibria is too large, which necessitates a re…nement. We impose the following intuitive technical assumptions.
First, we put on restrictions on the citizens'strategy space. We assume that citizen i revolts if and only if (i) she knows for sure that the share of those who want to replace the current ruler is su¢ cient for a successful revolt and (ii) she is among these dissatis…ed people. 8 A citizen wants to replace the ruler whenever she estimates the probability of the current dictator being competent being below , so the incumbent is worse than a random draw.
Second, we impose an assumption on the distribution F ( ) ; and L . Denote incentive to revolt do not depend on their perception of ruler's quality and, consequently, on the policy he conducts.
Persson and Tabellini avoid this problem by making an ad hoc assumption about the link between citizens'bene…ts from participating in a successful revolt (defense of democracy) and state variable ("democratic capital"). In this paper, however, we emphasize the importance of public information (as opposed to private signals) in collective action, not how agents may solve the collective action problem if their private signals are strong relative to the public one (and if the public signal is stronger, as is the case with free media, uniqueness of equilibrium, which is the most attractive feature of global games, disappears). We therefore opt to model revolutions di¤erently.
We assume that is su¢ ciently large so that for any n 1,
The intuition is as follows. Suppose a citizen expects that a competent dictator always provides public good A H , whereas an inept dictator provides public good A. A citizen who has received a stream of incomes x t at time moments t = 1; :::; n during the rule of the current dictator and has no other signals believes that the incumbent is at least as good as a random draw if and only if the likelihood ratio satis…es
Thus, we simply require that if the dictator is competent and provides high incentives to the bureaucrat, then the share of dissatis…ed citizens is su¢ ciently low so that there is no revolt. In particular, if H =v L ; the di¤erence in dictator's potential abilities, is su¢ ciently small or , the revolution threshold, is su¢ ciently large, the assumption holds for any distribution.
Finally, we impose the following Markovian (stationarity) condition: any dictator's strategy, which includes a choice of an incentive scheme and contracts with bureaucrat and/or secret service, depends only on dictator's type. This simpli…es the analysis as we do not need to study some counter-intuitive o¤-equilibrium paths; in the equilibrium we obtain, the dictator's strategy is the best response given his complete information set.
We consider equilibria where competent dictators (a = a H ) choose high-powered incentives for the bureaucrat without imposing censorship; this captures the presumption that competent rulers are an ideal benchmark that citizens compare the real rulers with. For such equilibria to exist, it is su¢ cient to require that the bureaucrat's cost of e¤ort is lower than the bene…t of successful implementation of the policy to the competent dictator c < A H A L . We will make a stronger
This assumption implies that high e¤ort is optimal even if the dictator is inept. The assumption holds whenever bureaucrats'e¤ort is not too costly (c is not too high) and/or the policy outcome does matter (A H A L is large).
Analysis
The analysis proceeds as follows. First, we study the behavior of the media and the security service given incentive contracts o¤ered by the dictator. Then we compute how much it costs the dictator to implement high-powered or low-powered incentives for the bureaucrats, ignoring for a moment potential e¤ects on the probability of remaining in power. After that we proceed with equilibrium responses of the citizens to the di¤erent reports by the media. Finally, we …nd out how dictator's choice of media freedom depends on the parameters of the model.
Bureaucrat, Media, and Secret Service
Denote the payments that the dictator makes to bureaucrat j if s 
Hence, inducing low e¤ort is costless for the dictator (it is su¢ cient to set w L = w H = 0), while to induce high e¤ort, he has to pay w H c= d , because w L 0. Thus, choosing w L = 0 and w H = c= d is the cheapest way to induce high e¤ort in the presence of free media. Now we proceed with the case of censored media. If the secret service learns that the policy is implemented successfully by bureaucrat j (so A j t = A H ), it cannot report a policy failure. If it learns about a failure by bureaucrat j, it compares the bribe b o¤ered by the bureaucrat with the di¤erence of its payo¤s, z L z H , in cases it reports a failure or a success. Therefore, the secret service reports a failure if and only if there is indeed a failure, and the bribe o¤er by the bureaucrat does not exceed its marginal payo¤ for reporting failure, i.e. b z L z H .
Each bureaucrat knows this, and thus, should the policy fail, he is willing to bribe the secret service by o¤ering the bribe b = z L z H as long as it is pro…table for him. If he bribes the secret service, he gets w H from the dictator, and if he does not, he gets w L . In other words, when bureaucrat's wage depends on the secret service's report, he o¤ers a bribe if and only if z L z H w H w L ; the size of the bribe then equals w H w L . One direct implication is that if the dictator wants to implement truth-telling by the secret service in the absence of free media, he has to satisfy the collusion-proofness constraint:
which will hold as an equality in equilibrium (the dictator minimizes his costs). An alternative way to look at this constraint is to compare the joint surplus of the bureaucrat-secret service coalition in the case of truthfully reporting failure and colluding to report success: collusion-proofness requires
The above discussion is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 The dictator of type d = L; H can choose one of the three following alternatives:
To induce a low e¤ ort level, the dictator o¤ ers w L = w H = 0 to the bureaucrat regardless of the dictator's own ability; he also does not allow free media and provides no incentives to the secret service z L = z H = 0. The dictator's expected payment to bureaucrats and secret service is 0.
To induce a high-powered incentive scheme via using free media, the dictator chooses w L ; w H = 0; c= d . The dictator does not pay anything to the secret service z L = z H = 0. The expected payment to the bureaucrat is 1
To provide high-powered incentives without free media, the dictator o¤ ers the contract w L ; w H = 0; c= d ) to each bureaucrat, and the contract z H = 0, z L = c= d to the secret service. With such payment schedules, there is no collusion between bureaucrats and the secret service.
Dictator's expected payment to the bureaucrats and secret service equals
Indeed, if the constraint (5) is satis…ed, or the dictator allows free media, the dictator will get a truthful signal s j t for sure. Bureaucrat's low e¤orts will lead to success with probability 0; in the case of high e¤orts, the probability is d . He then chooses high e¤orts if and only if expected increase in payo¤ exceeds costs c, i.e. w H w L c= d . The cheapest way to satisfy these constraints is by setting w L = 0, and w H = c= d . Similarly, if the secret service is used, the ruler should set z H = 0
The Proposition implies that the value of bureaucratic incentives is higher for the competent dictator. If the free media is allowed, the costs of providing incentives c are the same matter for dictators of both types. Yet, as the inept dictator's probability of success is lower L < H , the bene…ts of high-powered incentives are greater for the competent dictator. If the ruler does not allow free media, but still opts to have high-powered incentives, he must pay a wage w H = c= d to each bureaucrat who successfully implemented the policy and z L = w H to the secret service if it fails. Overall, the ruler pays c= d if he wants to implement high-powered incentives with secret service; this equals c (the same as in the case of free media) if the ruler is competent and c= L > c if he is not.
Like in conventional models of collusion in a three-tier hierarchy (e.g. Tirole, 1992) , there is no collusion in equilibrium. However, the risk of collusion incurs non-trivial costs: the need to provide collusion-proof incentives (5) distorts the dictator's payo¤s. If there were no threat of collusion, the dictator would pay w H in case of success, and nothing in case of failure (which occurs in equilibrium at least with probability 1 L > 0 for an inept dictator). The expected payments would be the same as in the case of media freedom. To ensure collusion-proofness, the dictator has to pay w H whatever the outcome is: to the bureaucrat in the case of success or to the secret service in the case of failure; the additional expected cost is therefore 1 L w H : Because of potential collusion, providing incentives via the secret service is costlier than via media freedom.
The Dictator and the Citizens
If a competent dictator always chooses high-powered incentive scheme for the bureaucrats with the help of free media, then his policy results in the optimal level of public good A H , and the media always reports a truthful signal s j t = A j t = A H for all bureaucrats. On the other hand, if the dictator is inept, there is a non-trivial probability 1 L that the policy t chosen at that period is a wrong one. In that case, there is a positive chance that the media will report the truth (that
; this probability, conditional on the policy failure, is equal to 1 if media is free and to > 0 if it is not. Therefore, a rational citizen who receives a signal s j t = A L is bound to believe (regardless of her private information) that the dictator is inept with certainty. Moreover, this information about the dictator's incompetence becomes common knowledge. As a result, all citizens will revolt and the ruler will be replaced. Now consider a dictator who has had only positive media reports up for n periods since his coming to power. In addition to private signals, each citizen has also received a stream of public signals s pub 1 ; : : : ; s pub n , which have all been positive. Therefore, by Bayes' formula, each citizen i attributes a non-trivial probability to the event that the incumbent ruler is competent. If the incumbent is competent, then the share of citizens who believe that he is inept would be less than if they use only private signals. Public signals are all favorable to the dictator, and therefore the share of those who believe that the dictator is inept basing on all available information is even lower.
Consequently, a citizen who has received a stream of positive public signals for all bureaucrats will never participate in a revolt. She cannot be sure that the share of citizens who think that the probability of the ruler being inept is above 1 , the average, is su¢ cient for a revolt to succeed.
This discussion is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Consider a dictator who has had only positive media reports until period t. Then in period t each citizen, given information available, assigns a strictly positive probability to the event that less than other citizens want the dictator replaced, and thus there is a positive chance that the revolt will not succeed.
One may compare this result to the winner's curse phenomenon in the common value auctions.
Here, each citizen gets a stream of private signals about the same variable (dictator's ability).
When a citizen becomes just ready to revolt, she believes that most other citizens lag behind her in their con…dence that the dictator is inept, because otherwise the revolt would have already occurred before (see Morris, 1995) . As long as media reports policy success, citizens are unable to transfer negative information to each other, and at any given moment they are too afraid to initiate a revolt. However, if media reports policy failure, it immediately becomes common knowledge that the dictator is inept and enable the citizens to coordinate.
We have also established the following proposition.
Proposition 3 The dictator stays in power as long as the citizens get s pub = A H . If citizens get s pub = A L , citizens revolt, and the dictator is replaced by a new one. No other public signal may be received by citizens in equilibrium.
The intuition is straightforward. Upon a positive report citizens update their beliefs on the probabilities of the two outcomes: (i) the dictator may be able or inept, and media are free (ii) the dictator is inept but media are controlled. As in the case (ii) there is a non-trivial probability of leakage of negative information, the positive report shifts the citizens' ex post beliefs in favor of (i). Any single negative report, however, informs the citizens that the dictator is inept and is therefore inferior to an average pick from the dictators'pool next period; hence the current dictator is replaced.
Media and the Choice of Bureaucratic Incentives
We now check that a competent dictator indeed chooses the high-powered incentive scheme if the assumption (3) holds.
Proposition 4 At any period of his tenure, a competent dictator is strictly better o¤ allowing free media and choosing a high-powered incentive scheme. His expected life-time utility is U =
Indeed, if a competent ruler chooses a high-powered incentive scheme, no revolt can take place.
Both the secret service and free media are equally costly to the dictator (each period, in equilibrium, he has to pay c to the bureaucrats and nothing to the secret service, as the policy failure cannot happen). By providing no incentives (apart from a chance of revolt) the ruler loses A H A L because of a chance of policy failure while gaining c by economizing on bureaucrat's wage. By assumption (3), providing no incentives is strictly dominated by providing high-powered incentives.
It is straightforward to show that the equilibrium utility of an able ruler is given by Bellman equation
implying U a = (1 ) 1 R + A H c . This establishes that high incentives via free media is indeed the best strategy for the competent ruler.
The inept dictator faces a far more complex trade-o¤: he needs to choose high-or low-powered incentives, and the monitoring mechanism. The dictator never chooses free media together with low-powered incentive scheme as low-powered incentive scheme with censored media is strictly better, thus only three options remain: (i) high incentives and free media (denote this choice M );
(ii) high incentives and censored media (we denote this choice S as the dictator relies on the secret service); (iii) low incentives (L).
Then the dictator's expected utility at the beginning of a period when he is in power by U is as follows U = max fU M ; U S ; U L g ; where
Denote solutions to equation U X (U ) = U by U X , where X 2 fM , S, Lg. Regime X is chosen whenever U X is the greatest of the three: for example, if U M > U S and U M > U L , then, since
so U = U M is the solution to the problem; all other cases may be considered in the same way.
Rearranging the terms, we obtain the solution:
Simple comparisons of (7) result in the following Proposition. 
Empirical Predictions
The model generates a number of testable predictions about determinants of media freedom. The main prediction is that in a non-democratic country, resource abundance (high R) results in lower media freedom. In a democracy, the dictator and his bureaucracy are bound to cope with free media. As shown above, if = 1; media freedom prevails in equilibrium under any level of resource richness R. If is slightly below 1 (and > 1 L ) then media freedom is suppressed only if resource abundance is very high. Thus, we do not expect to …nd signi…cant e¤ects of natural resources on media freedom in democratic countries where monitoring of bureaucracy is carried out via separation of powers, opposition parties etc. Proposition 5 implies that extra oil reserves have a negative e¤ect on media freedom. However, oil may have a non-linear impact on the incentives provided to bureaucrats, and thus on economic performance. In non-democratic countries (low ), an increase in resource rents …rst suppresses the bureaucratic incentives as the equilibrium moves from media freedom to low incentives regime.
Further increase in the resource rents raises the dictator's incentive to stay in power so that the dictator prefers to provide strong incentives to the bureaucracy albeit via a secret service rather than media freedom.
Robustness
While we introduced a number of simplifying assumptions to make the model tractable, our results are robust to the modelling choices. For example, suppose that smart dictators also make mistakes albeit with a lower probability H 2 ( L ; 1). The results still hold even though Bayesian updating will be somewhat more involved. In particular, citizens would allow dictators to remain in power after occasional policy failures. However, even smart dictators can be overthrown upon a series of mistakes due to bad luck.
We have assumed that the dictator does not punish the bureaucrat for the policy failure even when the dictator knows that the policy choice was right (e.g. because the dictator is able) and the failure is the bureaucrat's fault (this only happens out of equilibrium); he needs an outside veri…cation of the negative outcome -either by the secret service or by the media. If we extend the model to the case of non-trivial probabilities of success in case of wrong policy choice or low e¤ort, this would not be a problem -either success or failure may occur even if the bureaucrat works hard.
Yet another extension would be a departure from the assumption that bureaucrats work for only for one period. If there is a multi-period contracting environment, the dictator can o¤er the bureaucrat long-term incentives. In particular, the bureaucrat might be o¤ered a deferred compensation -a tenure premium, pension, or even a stake in a property controlled by the dictator -that will only be paid if the dictator himself remains in o¢ ce. This can result in an emergence of a crony capitalism where the incentives of the ruling elite are based on the legitimacy of their well-being which is in turn contingent on the regime's stability.
In our model, we have also neglected the cost of the ruler turnover. In many cases dismantling a dictatorship imposes substantial costs on the economy and the society. If these costs are substantial, out analysis would go through as long as the bene…ts of replacing an inept dictator are su¢ ciently high.
Each citizen updates her beliefs based on both public and private information. If the latter is consistently negative, the citizen knows that there is a high chance that the dictator is inept.
However, he will never be certain that many others know it as well. Hence, a revolt would fail with a non-trivial probability. Since there are individual losses but no individual gains from revolution, the revolt will be delayed until the negative information becomes public. This result follows from the absence of personal returns to taking part in a successful revolution. The result will change if the revolution leader receives private bene…ts if the revolution succeeds. Then, for some parameter constellations, revolution can happen even if the media only run positive news.
Evidence
In this section, we explore empirical evidence on the relationship between oil and media freedom using cross-sectional and panel data. To check the main testable prediction that the oil abundance has an adverse e¤ect on media freedom in non-democracies, we use data on natural resources, level of democracy, media freedom and economic performance.
Data
We employ several sources of data. As a proxy for media freedom we use Press Freedom index available from Freedom House. Although certain information on media freedom is available for years as early as 1979, detailed data are unavailable until 1993, so we use only data for years
1993-2004. Press Freedom is constructed by Freedom
House as an integer from 0 to 100, with 0 corresponding to ideally free media and 100 corresponding to no media freedom. However, to facilitate interpretation we use (100 Freedom House Index) as a measure of media freedom, so in this section, greater media freedom index corresponds to freer media. Note that Freedom House data captures both printed and broadcast media.
We used the democ variable from Polity IV dataset as a proxy for the degree of Democracy.
The variable ranges from 0 to 10 where 10 corresponds to perfect democracy. In some cases, democ variable is assigned 66, 77, or 88 value; this corresponds to missing data or political turmoil in a given country and year. We exclude such data from our dataset.
A number of papers (e.g., Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik, 2006 , Jensen and Wantchekon, 2004 , and Ross, 2001 ) proxies the resource endowments by using the share of natural resources in GDP or exports. Unfortunately, these variables may be highly endogenous with respect to both growth (or growth opportunities) and institutions. In fact, since mining industry does not usually require much human capital -and if it does, it may be very well provided by foreign …rms -the share of mining industry in GDP is actually a proxy for underdevelopment. For instance, the U.S. are well-endowed with natural resources, including oil; yet, mining and drilling comprise for a small part of GDP as other industries are highly developed as well. Moreover, high resource exports may also be, for any given resources endowment, a proxy for the lack of growth opportunities: the lack of internal demand for fuels makes producers export them.
We proxy resource endowment by the proven oil reserves which are presumably exogenous.
While investment in geological exploration a¤ects this variable, these investments need not depend on the level of economic development. Even if investment in exploration depend on country's level of development, it is more plausible that well-developed countries have had more time and resources to invest. Thus, ceteris paribus, proven reserves should be higher in well-developed countries; hence, this e¤ect would only bias our estimates towards null e¤ect. (Our results are robust to use of oil production and share of oil production/exports in GDP instead of oil reserves in regressions.)
Using reserves rather than other measures of resource-richness is consistent with our model's logic. Indeed, the dictator's incentives to censor the media are driven by the future resource rents he expects to get while in o¢ ce. It is therefore more important what oil rents will be appropriated in the future rather than the current production.
We focus on oil as it is by far the most important natural resource (Tsui, 2005) , reliable data on oil reserves and production are easily available, and it is globally-traded (unlike, e.g., natural gas). Countries di¤er in terms of the oil quality and of the extraction costs but the data on the latter are less reliable; also these di¤erences matter less in panel data regressions. We use data from Statistical Review of World Energy 2005, available on the BP's web-site (http://www.bp.com).
This Statistical Review contains only data for countries which have positive oil reserves or produce a positive amount of oil; therefore, we assumed trivial oil reserves and production for other countries, unless explicitly stated that data are not available. We use reserves in billion barrels rather than in dollar terms; we control for the oil price as we include time dummies in our panel regressions. Notice that the proven reserves include the reserves that are economically relevant given the prevailing oil price; this also makes this variable a proxy for the expected value of future resource rents.
In order to measure the e¤ect of media freedom on the quality of bureaucracy, we use the World Bank's data on government e¤ectiveness and regulatory quality (the Governance and AntiCorruption project of the World Bank Institute www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance).
Finally, we use data on GDP per capita (purchasing power parity), population, land area, and other relevant controls from the World Development Indicators.
Main Results
The results are presented in the Table 1 in the Appendix. These results are consistent with the model's predictions, and are robust to the choice of speci…cation, econometric methodology, and sample. In particular, the results hold both in cross-country OLS regressions and in panel regressions with country …xed e¤ects.
Controlling for the level of development (proxied by GDP per capita in purchasing power parity) and the level of democracy, media freedom is negatively correlated with oil reserves (column (1)).
This correlation is stronger in the less democratic countries. In column (2), we add an interaction term between democracy and oil reserves; not only the coe¢ cient at the oil reserves remains negative and signi…cant, but the coe¢ cient at the interaction term is positive and signi…cant. The less developed is the democracy, the stronger the negative e¤ect of oil reserves on media freedom.
We also control for the country size both in terms of land area and population. The former may be related to the costs of monitoring the bureaucracy, the latter may re ‡ect the importance of media as coordination device. The coe¢ cient signs are consistent with our model. The larger the land area, the harder it is for the dictator to monitor his bureaucracy, hence a greater need for media freedom. The more populous the country the harder it is for people to coordinate without media;
hence media is vital for overthrowing the dictator so the dictator prefers censorship. Including the country's population into the regression also helps assuring that we control for oil reserves per capita as well as the total oil reserves; similarly, we e¤ectively control for the share of reserves to GDP as we include logarithms of the total reserves, GDP per capita and population.
In column (3), we control for size of government (log share of government expenditures in GDP), literacy, internet penetration and inequality (captured by the Gini coe¢ cient). While the sample size is reduced, our results still hold. It is interesting that literacy has a negative e¤ect on media freedom: the more literate is the population, the costlier is the free media for the dictator; the bene…ts of the media do not depend on the literacy rate. Once we control for Internet and literacy, the sign of the coe¢ cient at the GDP per capita changes -indeed, it is the technological development and education rather than economic wellbeing per se that drives the choice of media freedom.
In column (4), we run the regression for the countries with non-trivial oil reserves and also obtain similar results.
In OLS regressions (1)- (4) Table 1 ). and all the independent variables are dated 1992 except for democracy which is also [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] average. To resolve the reverse causality problem, we estimate speci…cation (5) where we replace contemporaneous measures of democracy with its average level in 1980-1992. In column (6), we instrument democracy with the lagged democracy score and the results remain the same.
Our most important results come from using panel data for 1993-2004. First, we use countrylevel …xed e¤ects (column (7)) with robust standard errors; we also include time dummies to control for changes in global oil price and other global variables. In column (8) we estimate a pooled regression controlling for clustering at the country level.
In all speci…cations, the coe¢ cients at oil reserves and the interaction term between oil and democracy are signi…cant and robust; they also have similar values across all speci…cations.
The e¤ects are not only statistically but also economically signi…cant. The coe¢ cient -4 at the LogOilReserves implies that in a non-democratic country, a two-fold increase in oil reserves results in 4*ln(2)=2.8 change in media freedom score. Figure 2 presents the partial residual plot for media freedom and oil reserve (adjusted for other independent variables) which shows that the di¤erence in media freedom e.g. between United Arab Emirates and Mexico is explained by the respective di¤erence in oil reserves. The coe¢ cient 0.4 at the interaction term implies that the relationship between oil and media freedom weakens and eventually disappears as democracy score increases from 0 to 4/0.4=10 which is the level of democracy in OECD countries. This is fully consistent with our interpretation that media are crucial for bureaucratic incentives in the absence of separation of powers, opposition parties or other mechanisms present in democratic societies. Table 2 presents some robustness checks. Instead of including the interaction term, we run the OLS regression for democratic and non-democratic countries separately. Columns (1) and (2) in Table   2 present the results for the democracy threshold of democ = 8. The countries at this threshold are Brazil, Latvia, and Philippines. Other thresholds yield similar results. Oil reserves negatively a¤ect media freedom in non-democratic countries only.
Robustness checks and additional evidence
Regression (3) replaces oil reserves with oil production (OLS and FE speci…cations, respectively). In regression (5), we use the media freedom index from Reporters Sans Frontieres rather than the more conventional one from the Freedom House. In the regression (6) we control for 8 regional dummies. Column (7) presents the results of the regression with instrumental variables for the sample of non-democratic countries. In all the samples and speci…cations the results are consistent with our model's predictions.
The results are not driven by any single country or even region -we have tried to exclude all regions and individual countries one by one and the coe¢ cients remain signi…cant and had similar values. In panel regressions the results are also robust to excluding outlier observations. Table 3 reports the results on the e¤ect of media freedom on the quality of bureaucracy. We use two dependent variables: Government E¤ectiveness and Regulatory Quality. Column (1) and (2) report the OLS regressions for average values of these two indices for 1996-2004 whereas the independent variables refer to the year 1995. Regressions (3) and (4) are the panel regressions with country …xed e¤ects. In all speci…cations, media freedom positively and signi…cantly a¤ects quality of bureaucracy controlling for the level of development and democracy, and controlling for natural resources. While in cross-section regressions there is a signi…cant negative direct e¤ect of natural resources on the quality of bureaucracy, this relationship becomes insigni…cant in the panel regressions. This result suggests that media freedom is not just one of channels of the "resource curse" (the adverse e¤ect of natural resources on the quality of institutions); it may be the major channel.
Yet another interesting research question is to study the e¤ect of the interaction between resource abundance, media freedom and bureaucratic incentives on the long-run economic growth.
Unfortunately, as there are no systematic media freedom data prior to 1993, this is not possible.
Alternative explanations
There can be several other explanations of the relationship between natural resource endowment be correlated and media freedom in non-democratic societies. For example, if a benevolent dictator wants to reform his bureaucracy and is willing to do so via paying high e¢ ciency wages to bureaucrats. Resource rents allow to …nance strong incentives without distortionary taxation; and the greater the rents and therefore the higher the e¢ ciency wages the fewer independent journalists the dictator needs. The bureaucrats are punished very rarely but the punishment is large -the dictator takes away high e¢ ciency wage. This explanation is not very likely. First, it is at odds with anecdotal evidence: in non-democratic countries dictators prefer cheaper tools of providing incentives -e.g. imprisonment. Second, it would imply that resource endowment would be correlated with lower corruption and better governance. This is not consistent with the evidence we present in Table 3 : if there is a relationship between bureaucratic quality and it is an opposite one: ceteris paribus, resource-rich countries are less well-governed and more corrupt. In particular, if one excludes Media Freedom from speci…cations reported in Table 3 , oil reserves would have either insigni…cant or negative e¤ect on the quality of governance (we do not present results on corruption but they are similar).
A more realistic alternative explanation is a very simple one: non-democratic dictators do not like free media. However, citizens value media freedom per se hence the dictator has to pay for censorship. Similarly, if foreign partners or international organizations exert pressure for media freedom the dictator has be economically strong either to withstand this pressure or to buy o¤ the partners tacit acceptance of censorship. In both cases, resource rents provide a source of revenue that helps silence the media. However, this argument assumes that resource rents come as an additional revenue source. The story does not explain why controlling for the aggregate income (GDP) and for the total government spending, the dictator with a greater share of oil in the GDP and in government budget has easier time buying o¤ citizens or foreigners. Why are citizens happier to exchange media freedom for a dollar if this is a petrodollar. The argument that oil rents are less distortionary than taxes and therefore easier to use for comforting the citizens is actually not consistent. If taxes are distortionary, the dictator should pay o¤ the voters by lowering taxes rather than by giving out petrodollars (actually, many dictators do exactly this, granting voters with "no taxation" in exchange for "no representation"). Certainly, there is a potential role for inequality but we show that our results hold even when inequality is controlled for.
Yet another argument is that free media is a normal good, so it is more likely to occur in more a-uent societies. Coincidentally, rich countries are also the ones that are oil poor. However, as we control for per capita GDP, this argument does not invalidate our results.
Finally, media freedom as well as democracy can be driven by a long history of development of political and economic institutions, e.g. due to colonial history, legal origin, religion, culture etc. We show that our results hold even when controlling for country-level e¤ects; therefore all long-term and slowly changing factors are accounted for. It is also worth noting that cross-section and panel estimation produce similar magnitudes of the e¤ect.
Related literature
We draw upon four major strands in the literature. First, our paper is related to the fast growing literature on the so-called "resource curse". The lower growth rates of resource-rich countries are well-documented (see, e.g., Sachs and Warner, 1996 , 1997a ,b, Auty, 2001 , Gylfason, Herbertsson and Zoega, 1999 , and Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik, 2006 .
The early literature on the resource curse attributed the failure of growth-oriented strategies in resource rich-countries to the "Dutch disease" (see Warner, 1996, and Krugman, 1987 ).
Yet, there is now an emerging consensus that the major source of slow growth in resource-rich countries is institutions. First, resource abundance is not curse in countries with mature institutions; second, in the countries with poor institutions, the resource rents undermine institutional development which in turn slows down economic growth. The general mechanism was described by North (1981 North ( , 1991 and, most recently, by Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) ; the crucial role of institutions in generating the "resource curse" is analyzed in Lane and Tornell (1996), Ades and Di Tella (1999) , Robinson, Torvik, and Verdier (2004) , Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik (2006) , Caselli (2006) , and Boschini et al. (2006) . This literature focuses mostly on the e¤ect of resource abundance on the political process; in particular Ross (2001) and Tsui (2005) show that resource richness hinders democratization. Ross (2001) notes that critical empirical contributions to the modernization debate by Przeworski and Limongi (1993) and Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, and Limongi (2000) did not consider oil-rich Middle East states; in his own regressions, the Middle East dummy is signi…cant and has a negative impact on democracy.
We try to go beyond these general insights to explain the microeconomic mechanisms that lead to economically ine¢ cient policy choices. In this sense, our work is similar to Acemoglu, Robinson, and Verdier (2004) who consider an alternative micro-foundation for the resource curse: the divideand-rule policies of kleptocratic dictators. They show that resource rents help the kleptocrats remain in power by buying o¤ parts of the opposition.
Second, we use recent advances in political economics with its emphasis on dynamic models of strategic interaction (e.g., Acemoglu and Robinson, 2005 , Acemoglu, 2003 , Laguno¤, 2006 , Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003 , Konrad and Skaperdas, 2005 , Restrepo, 2002 , and Gallego and Pitchik, 2004 . The literature on optimal sequencing between economic and political liberalization is discussed in Persson and Tabellini (2006) , who are also the …rst to consider a revolution as a global game.
Third, we employ insights from contract theory and the corporate governance literature that focuses on providing incentives to subordinates in a hierarchy (e.g., Williamson, 1967 , Calvo and Wellisz, 1978 , Holmstrom, 1979 , Wilson, 1989 , Prendergast, 1993 , Qian, 1994 , and Dewatripont, Jewitt, and Tirole, 1999 . Kofman and Lawarree (1993) extend Tirole's model (1986 Tirole's model ( , 1992 to compare internal and external auditors. Similar to free media in our model, external auditors are costlier but, at least in theory, never collude. Friebel and Raith (2004) model a three-tier hierarchy where there is a risk of value destruction as the middle-manager fears competition from his own subordinates and therefore is not willing to hire or promote the best talent. Friebel and Guriev (2005) were clean because they were too complicated" (Maclean and Elkind, 2003, p. 152) . The Enron case is also an illustration of the importance of risks of collusion with auditors: the auditors (the Houston o¢ ce of Arthur Andersen) did not want to lose a generous client that paid Arthur Andersen hundreds of millions of dollars in consulting fees. To avoid collusion, anti-trust authorities often o¤er leniency arrangements for cartel participants (Spagnolo, 2000) . Similarly to our independent media, cartel participants cannot commit to keep the relevant information from the public.
The fourth strand is the fast-growing literature on the economics of media. Sen (1999), Besley and Burgess (2002) , Besley and Prat (2006) emphasize the role of independent media in enhancing citizens'ability to choose right politicians and policies. Reinikka and Svensson (2005) and Kaufman (2006) show that media help to reduce corruption. Besley and Prat (2006) consider media capture in democracies. Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005) and Baron (2006) construct models explaining the observed media biases, while Petrova (2006) and Corneo (2006) explain the negative impact of economic inequality on media freedom. Svaleryd and Vlachos (2006) demonstrate that in a mature democracy increased political competition and extensive media coverage reduce political rents.
Using cross-country data on media ownership in 97 developing and developed countries, Djankov et al. (2003) conclude that "worse" outcomes are correlated with state ownership of media; at the same time, state ownership of all forms of media is much higher in less democratic countries. Dyck and Zingales (2002) consider the situation where business reporting is endogenously biased; free competitive media is the only way to commit not to collude with the source of exclusive information.
Conclusions
We study the determinants of media freedom in non-democratic societies. In such societies, the dictator needs an independent source of information on the outcomes of his policies. Otherwise he cannot provide incentives to his bureaucracy which may result in poor economic performance and eventually cost him his job. The dictator may choose to allow at least partial media freedom or to build a secret service that would report on the bureaucracy directly to him. In the latter case, there is a risk of collusion between the monitor and the bureaucrat. The dictator can overcome collusion by providing high-powered incentives to the monitor but it is costly. On the other hand, independent and competitive media cannot commit not to provide this information to the citizens. Such leakage undermines the very basis of the non-democratic regime: the collective action problem in organizing a revolution. If citizens receive the same signal about the poor outcomes of the dictator's policies, e.g. with the help of mass media, they solve the coordination problem and overthrow the dictator. In resource rich countries, the value of remaining in o¢ ce is relatively high while the need to provide incentives to bureaucracy is relatively less important. Therefore our theory predicts a negative relationship between resource abundance and media freedom; this relationship is especially strong in less democratic countries.
Recently, two authoritarian regimes have seemingly de…ed this logic: Belarus and China. Both are (relatively) resource-poor and have tightly controlled media, while being apparently successful in terms of economic growth. Our model helps to read these cases. Belarus has been receiving substantial support from Russia, mostly in terms of heavily subsidized prices for oil and natural gas; BRATT (2006) estimates the direct bene…ts due to these subsidies on oil and gas prices alone at the level of 15% Belarussian GDP. Essentially, Alexander Lukashenko, the Belarussian President can a¤ord censorship and heavy reliance on secret service; the support from Russia provides su¢ cient rents as if Belarus were a resource-rich country. 9
In China, the ruling party is facing exactly the "Gorbachev's dilemma"that is the focus of our paper. On one hand, the tight control over the media stands in the way of attempts to improve bureaucratic performance as the SARS story vividly demonstrated. On the other, free media would have provided a challenge to the rule of the Chinese Communist Party. One way to deal with the information problem that has been followed by the Chinese leadership is to decentralize economic decision-making and even introduce elections at municipal and provincial level. In principle, such mechanisms might prevent nationwide information aggregation but for the very same reason they only partially mitigate the incentive costs of censorship. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Notes: Regressions (1)-(5) are OLS.
(1) is basic regression; in (2) we add the interaction term; in (3) we introduce other controls which, however, limit our sample. In (4) we run the same specification as (2) on the subsample of countries with non-trivial oil reserves. In (5) we use lagged democracy (averaged 1980-1992) instead of contemporaneous democracy. In (6) we instrument democracy (averaged 1993-2003) by lagged democracy (averaged 1980-1992) , while. In panel regressions (7) and (8) Robust standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Notes: Regressions (1)-(4), (6) are OLS. (1) is for subsample of non-democratic countries (democracy averaged for years 1993-2003 is at most 8), (2) is for subsample of democratic countries (democracy greater that 8). In regression (3),(4) we replace oil reserves with oil production, and in (4) we use media freedom data from Reporters Sans Frontières instead of Freedom House. In (6) we control for regional dummies (8 regions total). In (7) we instrument democracy (averaged 1993-2003) by lagged democracy (averaged 1980-1992) for a subsample of non-democratic countries. In OLS regressions, Log GDP per capita PPP, Log oil reserves, Log oil production, and Log population are for year 1992; Democracy (alone and in (1)- (3) and (5)- (7) and (100 -media freedom, Reporters Sans Frontières) for year 2004 in column (4). Robust standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Notes: Regressions (1)-(2) are OLS, (3)-(4) fixed effects. In regressions (1)-(2) Log GDP per capita PPP, Log oil reserves, Log land area, and Log population are for year 1995; Government Effectiveness and Democratic Quality are averaged for the period 1996-2004. In regressions (3)-(4), the average number of observations per country is 4.8.
